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FOR PUBLICATION 
 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
_________________ 
 
NO. 93-3258 
_________________ 
 
NANCY MARDELL, 
 
          Appellant 
 
v. 
 
HARLEYSVILLE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
a Pennsylvania Corporation 
 
(D.C. Civ. No. 91-01493) 
 
Present: BECKER, NYGAARD, Circuit Judges, and 
YOHN, District Judge.1 
 
(Filed July 20, 1995) 
_________________________________________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT SUR REMAND FROM THE 
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
_________________________________________ 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 This case is before us on remand from the United States 
Supreme Court in light of its recent opinion in McKennon v. 
Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879 (1995).  Our 
original opinion, Mardell v. Harleysville Life Insurance Co., 31 
F.3d 1221 (3d Cir. 1994), is almost entirely consistent with 
McKennon.2  However, it does vary in one important respect:  the 
                                                           
1Honorable William H. Yohn, Jr., United States District Judge for 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
2Plaintiff Nancy Mardell brought this Title VII claim alleging 
that she was discharged because of her gender and age.  During 
3 
calculation of back pay.  In Mardell we concluded that, to ensure 
that the plaintiff was returned to the position she would have 
been in but for the discrimination, backpay should be awarded for 
the period from the discharge until judgment unless the employer 
could “somehow insulate its illegal actions from its discovery of 
the unfavorable evidence.”  Id. at 1238-40.  McKennon, to the 
contrary, decided that, absent extraordinary circumstances, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
discovery Harleysville learned that she had misrepresented 
certain background information on her résumé and job application, 
and moved for summary judgment on the ground that the company 
would never have hired her and, in fact, would have fired her had 
it known of the misrepresentations.  The district court granted 
defendant’s motion based on the “after-acquired evidence,” but we 
reversed, holding that Harleysville could not introduce the 
evidence “substantively for the purpose of defending against 
liability.”  31 F.2d at 1238.  We also concluded that the after-
acquired evidence may be relevant at the remedies stage of the 
proceedings.  We noted that if the employer could prove that the 
plaintiff would have been fired had it known about the newly-
discovered wrongdoing, equitable relief, such as reinstatement, 
might be barred if “particularly invasive of the employer’s 
‘traditional management prerogatives.’”  31 F.3d at 1239-40. 
 McKennon too held that after-acquired evidence would 
not provide an employer a complete defense to liability on a 
plaintiff’s claim that she was discharged in violation of federal 
anti-discrimination laws.  The Court reasoned (as had we) that: 
(1) barring all relief for violations of Title VII or the ADEA 
would undermine the key objectives of those statutes:  deterrence 
of illegal discrimination and compensation to plaintiffs injured 
by such discrimination, 115 S. Ct. at 884-85; and (2) although an 
“essential element” in determining whether the employer violated 
federal law is “the employer’s motives in ordering the 
discharge,” id. at 885, after-acquired evidence is not relevant 
to that question since the wrongdoing revealed by the evidence 
was not discovered until after the discharge, see id. (“The 
employer could not have been motivated by knowledge it did not 
have . . . [at the time the plaintiff was discharged].”).  The 
Court also ruled, as had we, that after-acquired evidence may be 
used to limit the remedies available to a plaintiff where the 
employer can “first establish that the wrongdoing was of such 
severity that the employee in fact would have been terminated on 
those grounds alone if the employer had known of it at the time 
of the discharge.”  Id. at 886-87. 
4 
backpay runs only until the date that the employer discovered the 
conduct for which it would have fired the employee.  Needless to 
say, we are bound by McKennon. 
 Accordingly, while we reaffirm and reinstate our 
original opinion and judgment in all other respects, we will 
vacate the portion of the opinion and judgment that deals with 
backpay.  Inasmuch as our original opinion and judgment reversed 
the grant of summary judgment and McKennon in essence affirms on 
this point, the case will be remanded for trial (and such further 
discovery or pretrial proceedings as the district court shall 
deem appropriate).3  With respect to backpay, the district court 
should be guided by McKennon.  In particular, if Harleysville 
proves that it would have terminated the plaintiff’s employment 
for the reason revealed by the after-acquired evidence,4 see 
Shattuck v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 49 F.3d 1106, 1108-09 (5th 
Cir. 1995) (“would have fired” standard, rather than “would not 
have hired” standard, applies to after-acquired evidence of 
résumé fraud in discriminatory discharge case); see also Wehr v. 
                                                           
3We decline plaintiff’s invitation to tell the district court how 
to manage the case on remand.   While bifurcation may sometimes 
be advisable as a vehicle to insure that after -acquired 
evidence not be improperly used during the liability phase, in 
other cases cautionary instructions or stipulations may render it 
unnecessary.  We do, however, agree with plaintiff that the 
district court would be well advised to permit further discovery 
on the résumé fraud issue, on which the defendant of course bears 
the burden of proof during the remedies phase. 
4In the absence of a record, we will not opine on plaintiff’s 
contentions as to the type or quantum of evidence (such as a 
policy or custom) that Harleysville must adduce to establish that 
it would in fact have fired her upon discovering her résumé 
fraud, preferring to leave that issue to the district court in 
the first instance. 
5 
Ryans Family Steak House, Inc., 49 F.3d 1150, 1154 n.5 (6th Cir. 
1995), backpay should run from the discharge to the time that the 
wrongdoing was discovered, although truly exceptional 
circumstances may be considered in fashioning appropriate 
relief.5 
 Finally, we recognize that Harleysville maintains that 
no remand is necessary, since it contends that this court may 
properly grant summary judgment in its favor.  Relying on United 
States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 112 S.Ct. 1867 (1992), which held 
that recoveries for Title VII backpay awards prior to the 1991 
Civil Rights Act may not be excluded from gross income as 
“damages received . . . on account of personal injuries,” id. at 
242, 112 S. Ct. at 1874 (internal quotation marks omitted), 
Harleysville suggests that where an employee had engaged in 
résumé fraud, the resulting “employment contract” is voidable 
under the doctrine of fraud in the inducement, and therefore that 
in litigation such as this, the former employee is entitled to no 
                                                           
5We make no effort at this juncture to adumbrate the contours of 
the “extraordinary equitable circumstances” doctrine, see 
McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 886.  The district court will have to 
explore that subject, if presented by an appropriate record, on 
remand.  Concomitantly, we also decline Harleysville’s invitation 
to balance the equities “and address the proper boundaries of the 
equitable relief” here, or to “use this case to indicate how the 
differing equities of résumé fraud and on-the-job misconduct 
affect the remedies available to plaintiffs.”  Instead, we simply 
note that the Supreme Court did not limit the general principles 
articulated in McKennon to cases involving on-the-job misconduct, 
instead using the broader term “wrongdoing” as well as listing 
both types of after-acquired evidence cases (résumé fraud cases 
and cases of on-the-job misconduct) -- without distinguishing 
between them -- when it noted the split among the circuits, see 
McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 883.  See also infra. 
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damages whatsoever.  However, the protections of Title VII and 
the ADEA are grounded not in a plaintiff’s “right” to a 
particular job but in a federal proscription of discrimination in 
employment, see Mardell, 31 F.3d at 1232-33 & nn.19-20.   
 One purpose of Title VII is “to make persons whole for 
injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment 
discrimination,” Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418, 
95 S. Ct. 2362, 2372 (1975) (emphasis supplied), and as this 
court explained in its initial opinion in this case, “[a] victim 
of discrimination suffers a dehumanizing injury as real as, and 
often of far more severe and lasting harm than, a blow to the 
jaw,” Mardell, 31 F.3d at 1232.  Furthermore, the Supreme Court 
explained in McKennon that “an absolute rule barring any recovery 
of back pay [where there is after-acquired evidence of wrongdoing 
by the employee] would undermine the ADEA’s objective of forcing 
employers to consider and examine their motivations, and of 
penalizing them for employment decisions that spring from 
discrimination.”  115 S. Ct. at 886.  We therefore reject 
defendant’s Burke argument, which contravenes the letter and the 
spirit of McKennon, Title VII, and the ADEA, and will remand this 
case to the district court for further proceedings consistent 
with the opinion. 
 
 
